In this paper, we study the joint rate and multi-channel power allocations in spectrum sharing networks (SSNs) with balanced QoS provisioning and power saving. We formulate this cross layer problem as a non-cooperative game GJRP A in which each user aims to achieve its target data rate as exactly as possible and minimize its power consumption at the same time. We investigate the properties of Nash equilibrium (N.E.) for GJRP A, including its existence, and properties of QoS provisioning as well as power saving. With the decomposition technique, we propose a distributed algorithm to find the N.E. for GJRP A from any feasible initialization and provide a sufficient condition for its convergence. Simulation results are presented to show the validity of our proposed algorithm. Performance tradeoff between QoS provisioning and power saving are investigated via tuning the weighting factors. Besides, advantages of our GJRP A over conventional iterative water filling (IWF) are also analyzed.
INTRODUCTION
The fast development of wireless communication systems with heterogeneous Quality of Service (QoS) requirements and different mobile device capabilities entails a great demand for flexible and efficient access mechanism to the valuable spectrum resources. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA), which allows different systems to share a common part of spectrum under certain restrictions, has been considered a Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. QShine08 July 28-31, 2008, Hong Kong, China promising technique to fullfill this demand for next generation ubiquitous wireless networks. At present three categories of DSA has been classified [1] , including: (a) Exclusive use model ; (b) Hierarchical access model ; (c) Open sharing model. The first two access models, i.e., Exclusive use model and Hierarchical access model are based on interference-free restrictions, which means that strict orthogonality is guaranteed in radio resources (time slot and/or spectrum channel) used by different systems. While in the Open sharing model unlicensed systems 1 are free to use some common frequency band with their mutual interference limited. For example, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth horizontally share the unlicensed ISM band in adjacent area without causing harmful interference to each other. Despite gaining advantages of flexible and easy implementation, the open spectrum sharing faces the risks of inefficiency and unfairness in spectrum utilization, which is mainly due to the selfish nature of individual system. These drawbacks become more serious when mobile users with heterogeneous QoS requirements, different power capacities and asymmetric channel conditions coexist.
Current research reveals that blindly maximizing either the aggregate system utility [2] or each user's own utility [3] always results in unfairness among users and inefficiency in spectrum utilization of the whole system. [5] studies this unfairness issue with repeated game by assuming a long term interaction among users. [9] considers the heterogeneous QoS requirements in SSNs and proposes a non-cooperative game with piece-wise utility function. However, this simple and intuitive design of utility function has a drawback of non-continuity, therefore influencing the existence of N.E..
Besides QoS guarantee, power saving is also an important issue in SSNs because most of the mobile devices are power-limited. Motivated by these considerations, we study the joint rate and power allocations in SSNs with both QoS provisioning and power saving. We first formulate this problem as a non-cooperative game GJRP A in which each user selfishly aims to achieve its target QoS requirement with as low power allocation as possible. A cost function with multi-objective expression is adopted for each user to indicate its consideration on both QoS provisioning and power saving. Then we investigate the properties of N.E. for our GJRP A, including its existence, and properties of QoS provisioning as well as power saving. Furthermore, we analyze our proposed game model based on decomposition technique [6] and design a distributed algorithm to find the N.E for it. Different from [7] focusing on source coding in application layer, our game model addresses the link layer rate allocation and PHY layer multi-channel power allocation problem. Moreover, we characterize our GJRP A as potential game [14] and provide the properties of N.E. from this particular game model's perspective.
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2, we present the SSNs scenario and the game model with joint rate and power allocations. We investigate the properties of N.E. for our formulated game in Section 3. Decomposition structure is introduced in Section 4 and detailed study of PHY layer power allocation game is presented. We propose a distributed algorithm to find the N.E. in Section 5. Simulation results are presented in Section 6 and we conclude this paper in Section 7.
NETWORK MODEL AND GAME THE-ORETIC FORMULATION
We consider a multi-channel SSNs as shown in Figure  1 , where a set of users N = {1, 2, ..., N } share a common part of spectrum B which is equally divided into a set of K = {1, 2, ..., K} channels. Each user i ∈ N consists of a transmitter T Xi and an intended receiver RXi. We assume that each user i has a target QoS represented by target data rate R tar i at link layer. Each user i selfishly aims to achieve its R tar i as exactly as possible and minimize its power allocation at the same time. In this paper we focus on the cases that the target rate profile (R tar 1 , R tar 2 , ..., R tar N ) of all users are acceptable to the network. Issues about determining the feasible region of target rate profile and designing an admission control mechanism with which users requiring unacceptable target rates can be identified are our future work.
Due to the co-channel interference among different users, their achievable data rates are coupled together and conflicting with each other. Therefore, we formulate this multiuser rate and power allocation problem as a non-cooperative game with the formal description given as follows:
where N denotes the set of users coexisting in SSNs, χi and Ψi represent user i's strategy space and cost function respectively. Since achieving the target rate R tar i and minimizing the power allocation are two conflicting objectives, we design a cost function Ψi for each user i with a multi-objective expression [10] as follows:
where the two-tuple expression (ri, p i ) includes user i's rate allocation ri, and power allocation vector pi = (p In GJRP A, due to the co-channel interference, each user i's strategy space χi is coupled with all the other users. Specifically, the strategy space of user i can be expressed as: 
guarantees that user i's rate allocation ri in link layer can't exceed the maximum achievable data rate according to its power allocation pi in PHY layer, given all the other users' power allocations
has the informationtheoretic capacity formula as:
where
is the power of interference plus background noise measured by user i's receiver on channel k. g k ji is the channel gain from user j's transmitter to user i's receiver over channel k 3 . n k i is the power of background noise of user i over channel k. Therefore, based on (3) the strategy profile space χ for GJRP A can be expressed as:
can be set as user i's minimum tolerable data rate and R max i can be determined by user i's maximum achievable data rate without considering the interference from other users. We assume in this paper that R
can be considered as user i's spectrum mask constraints on channel k, which are specific to cognitive radio system [13] . 3 We consider a relatively static network in this work, i.e., the set of channel gains g k ji , ∀i, j ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K keeps unchanged during the time interval of interest.
Given p−i, each user i ∈ N faces a joint rate and power allocations problem as follows:
According to the definition of Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) [19] , the equilibrium rate and power allocation profile (r * , p * ) for GJRP A should satisfy the following equilibrium condition:
which guarantees that no single user has the incentive to deviate from N.E. unilaterally.
PROPERTIES OF N.E.
In this section we first investigate the existence and uniqueness of N.E. for GJRP A. Then we study the properties of QoS provisioning 4 and power saving of N.E..
Existence and Uniqueness
In GJRP A each user i simultaneously achieves its equilibrium rate allocation r * i and power allocation p * i after arriving at N.E. characterized by (7) . By viewing GJRP A as a potential game [14] , we describe the existence of N.E. in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 : There always exists a pure strategy N.E. for
Proof. The GJRP A can be considered as a potential game with exact potential function F given as: Let Pmin denote the set of minima of F on χ. Pmin always holds non-empty because χ is a compact set and F is continuous, bounded on χ. Furthermore, F is continuously differentiable in the interior of χ and convex on χ. Therefore, according to Theorem 3 and Corollary 5 [14] , there exists at least one pure strategy N.E. in GJRP A on χ.
Furthermore, still based on Theorem 3 [14] , the uniqueness of N.E. for GJRP A follows if the strategy profile space χ is a compact, convex set. However, in fact the convexity of χ cannot be guaranteed and many studies have been carried out either to convexify the capacity formula
) by assuming the high SINR conditions [6] [3] or to convexify the capacity region [8] by assuming a sufficient number of orthogonal channels and the feasibility of time sharing among users. In this work, we only report via simulation that the uniqueness of N.E. for GJRP A is always observed using our proposed algorithm if certain channel condition is met, which we will describe in Section 5.
QoS Provisioning and Power Saving
An important property of GJRP A is that after arriving at the N.E. each user i can get a satisfactory balance between QoS provisioning and power saving according to its value of
. Specifically, no user will get redundant data rate beyond its target rate and no power is wasted to achieve unwanted data rate, i.e., the rate allocation constraint (4) is strictly binding at the N.E.. We describe these two properties in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 : The following two properties always hold at the N.E. of GJRP A: 
DUAL DECOMPOSITION AND LAYERED STRUCTURE
We introduce partial dual decomposition into GJRP A in this section, through which we show that our joint resource allocation game can be decomposed vertically into a set of rate allocations with QoS provisioning for each individual user and a weighted multi-channel power allocation game with linear pricing among all users.
Our GJRP A differs from conventional models in that each user i has rate-power two-tuple strategy (ri, pi) simultaneously, and ri, pi are coupled by constraint (4). We use partial dual decomposition to relax this constraint and treat the corresponding dual variable zi as a coordinator between rate allocation and power allocation for each user i. Specifically, the Lagrangian function for user i can be written as:
Therefore, given dual variable zi, each user i's optimization problem (6) can be vertically separated into two subproblems as follows: (a) Rate allocation with QoS provisioning in link layer
(b) Power allocation with linear pricing in PHY layer
Subproblems (a) and (b) are connected by the dual problem as follows:
For any given p−i, according to Slater's conditions [16] , strong duality exists between each user i's primal convex problem (6) and dual problem (10) . Therefore, the optimum solution for (6) can always be found by solving (10) without any performance loss.
We note in (9) that the optimal power allocation p * i (zi, p−i) of each user i also depends on other users' power allocations. Given a dual vector z = (z1, z2, ..., zN ), the PHY layer multi-channel power allocations can be expressed as a non-cooperative game with linear pricing mechanism among all users as follows:
In GW P A(z), each user i has an independent strategy space only determined by its own power allocation range Ω P i and its cost function can be written as:
where the achievable data rate
is weighted by the dual variable zi to indicate its QoS weighting factor and a linear pricing mechanism βi P k∈K p k i is incorporated to address its power saving consideration. In [3] the authors investigate the information rate maximization game GIRM as follows:
Our weighted power allocation game GW P A generalizes GIRM by incorporating both the QoS weighting factor from link layer and power saving factor from PHY layer into each user's cost function. Figure 2 shows the decomposition structure for our GJRP A. Since GW P A plays an important role in our decomposition structure and differs from many other studies, we investigate the properties of N.E. for GW P A in detail and describe them in the following lemma. Lemma 3 : (a) There always exists a pure strategy N.E. for GW P A(z) on the strategy profile space Ω P = Ω 
where ρ(.) denotes the spectrum norm and for each k ∈ K, the N by N matrix G k is defined as: Proof. We only describe the key points in proof of Lemma 3 due to the limited space. Detailed procedures can be referred to [11] . With respect to the proof of existence, we show that: (a) for each user i ∈ N , its strategy space Ω P i is a compact and convex set, and (b) for each user i ∈ N , its cost function Θi(zi, pi, p−i) is continuous on strategy profile space Ω P and strictly convex on pi. Therefore, according to Theorem 4.3 [18] , there exists a pure strategy N.E. for GW P A(z) over Ω P . With respect to the proof of uniqueness, we provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of N.E. for GW P A(z) by extending Theorem 2 in [3] . Lemma 3 (b) indicates that the equilibrium power allocation profile of GW P A(z) is a well-defined function of dual vector z as long as z > 0, β ≥ 0 and the channel condition (14) is met. This desirable property is exploited in our proposed algorithm to find the N.E. for GJRP A in Section 5.
DISTRIBUTED RATE AND POWER AL-LOCATION ALGORITHM
We propose a distributed algorithm to find the N.E. for GJRP A in this section. Our algorithm is based on the decomposition structure of rate allocation (8), weighted power allocation game GW P A(z) (11) and the coordinating dual problem (10) . To facilitate the proposed algorithm, we assume synchronization among all users and design two different time scales for rate and power updating. Specifically, let ∆T denote the long updating interval for both link layer rate allocation and dual updating. Meanwhile, let ∆t = ∆T /M denote the short updating interval for PHY layer power allocation, where M is a sufficient large number such that for any given dual vector z, the equilibrium power allocation for GW P A(z) can be reached before the end of ∆T . Figure  3 shows the procedures of rate, power allocation and dual updating in a single ∆T .
We propose our distributed rate and power allocation in algorithm (DRPA) below.
We remark our proposed algorithm as follows: Remark 1: Algorithm (DRPA) shows that after receiving the dual variable zi and pricing factor βi, each user i requires channel gain g (18) using only local information. Therefore, the proposed distributed power allocation algorithm (DRPA) relies mostly on local measurements and requires few message exchange. Remark 2: The convergence of algorithm (DRPA) can be described as follows. First of all, we provide a convergence lemma for the distributed power allocation (17) as follows:
Lemma 4: The Jacobian iteration for power allocation (17) during each long updating interval ∆T always converges to the equilibrium power allocation profile for GW P A(z) with any given dual vector z > 0 and pricing vector β ≥ 0 if the channel condition (14) is satisfied.
Proof. Our proof is based on [12] and detail procedures can be referred to [11] . Lemma 4 states that the sufficient condition for the unique N.E. in GW P A(z) also serves as the convergence condition for (17) . Similar results have been provided in Theorem 1 [4] for conventional IWF, where, however, the pricing mechanism for power allocation is not considered.
Second, the sub-gradient updating (18) is guaranteed to converge to the optimal dual value if the step-size ζ is chosen according to the diminishing rule [17] . Furthermore, according to the convexity of (6) and Slater's condition, there exists no dual gap between the primal optimum of (6) and dual optimum of (10) . Therefore, the whole algorithm (DRPA) can always converge to the N.E. for GJRP A. Remark 3: As described above, the value of M should be chosen large enough so that the Jacobian iteration for power allocation (17) can converge to the equilibrium point for GW P A(z) before the end of each ∆T . However, our simulation results show that convergence of power allocation for GW P A(z) during each ∆T is not strictly required and about M = 2 to 5 is generally enough for the whole algorithm (DRPA) to converge.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulation results are presented in this section to show the validity of our proposed distributed rate and power allocation algorithm. We build a network scenario where N = 6 users share K = 10 channels with bandwidth B/K = 1 per channel. Users are located at different places and the channel gains g k ij , ∀i, j ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K are generated according to the path-loss model 5 . Same background noise power n k i = 0.1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K is assumed and we only consider the channel realization with the condition (14) satisfied.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the convergence of our algorithm for a random channel realization. The weighting factors are set as Figure 4 shows the convergence of total power allocation for each user. Figure 5 shows the convergence of rate allocation. The solid lines denote rate allocations of users 1, 3, 5. The dash-dot lines marked by circle, triangle and asterisk denote the achievable data rates according to users 1, 3, 5's power allocations in PHY layer. It is shown in Figure 5 that after convergence, the equilibrium multi-channel power allocations in PHY layer provide exactly the equilibrium rate allocations of users 1 ,3, 5 in link layer without any power waste. Meanwhile, users 1, 3,
ij is the path loss between T Xi and RXj with exponent γ (we set γ = 2) and ξ k ij is a normalized random factor modeling the frequency selective fading across different channels. 5 almost get their target data rates without any redundance. Therefore, no power is wasted by any user to get unwanted rate. Figure 6 shows the convergence of coordinating dual variable for each user. Figure 7 shows the tradeoff between QoS provisioning and power saving for each user i through tuning the value of Figure 7 that with large value of
, (i.e., putting more emphasis on QoS guarantee), user 1 can achieve larger data rate but consuming more power. However, with small value of α 1 β 1 (i.e., putting more emphasis on power saving), user 1 can save more power but with the degradation in data rate. The pair of solid and dash-dot lines marked with triangle show the similar performance tradeoff for user 3. So does the pair of lines marked with pentagram for user 5. Meanwhile, it is also shown in Figure 7 that each user i almost achieves above 95% of its target rate if it puts enough emphasis on QoS provisioning (e.g., Table I shows the comparison of equilibrium results between our proposed GJRP A and GIRM [4] where each user blindly aims to maximize its transmission rate for one random channel realization. In Table I , P Table I that GIRM generates the result that each user may attain redundant data rate larger than required at the cost of exhausting its power capacity. In comparison, at the N.E. of our GJRP A, all users almost achieve their target rates with only negligible gaps and none of them spends more power than needed to get any redundant rate, therefore achieving the power saving objective at the same time. Meanwhile, thanks to the QoS guiding and power saving properties, GJRP A gains the advantage of lowering down the aggregate interference level in SSNs, which is especially useful in cases where the QoS requirements (i.e., target data rates) are inversely proportional to the power capacities. Table II demonstrates this advantage of GJRP A using the same set of channel gains and power capacities as the case in Table I, Table II , GIRM generates the same equilibrium state as in Table I due to its blindness in QoS and power saving, which results in that users 1, 2 cannot get their target rates both due to their own power limitations as well as too much interference caused by other users. In comparison, at the N.E. of our GJRP A, all users almost can get their target rates even without using up all of their power capacities. As explained before, the reason is that users 3, 4, 5, 6 become QoS guided and avoid too much power allocation to get unwanted data rates, which therefore reduces the aggregate interference level in SSNs and makes the target rates of users 1, 2 acceptable.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the joint rate and multi-channel power allocations in SSNs with balanced QoS provisioning and power saving. We formulate this cross layer problem as a non-cooperative game GJRP A in which each user aims to achieve its target QoS as exactly as possible and minimize its power allocation at the same time. We investigate the properties of N.E. for GJRP A, including its existence, and properties of QoS provisioning as well as power saving. In addition, we propose a distributed algorithm to find the N.E. for GJRP A and provide a sufficient condition for its convergence. Simulation results are presented to show the validity of our proposed algorithm and examples are given to illustrate the advantage of our GJRP A. We make an assumption in this paper that the target rate profile (R is acceptable to the whole SSNs. However, practical cases in which target rates of some users are not acceptable can occur. Our future work is to analyze these cases and design a distributed admission control mechanism so that users with unacceptable target rates can be identified.
